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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3778 
______________ 
 
 
 
ROQUE DE LA FUENTE, a/k/a Rocky, 
      Appellant 
  
v. 
 
PEDRO A. CORTES, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania; JONATHAN M. MARKS, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation 
 
 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 1-16-cv-01696) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III 
______________ 
 
 
  
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2018 
 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, NYGAARD, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
 
  
(Opinion filed:  August 7, 2018) 
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______________ 
 
O P I N I O N* 
______________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellant, Roque “Rocky” De La Fuente, lost the 2016 United States Presidential 
Election and avers that he will run again in 2020.  After his defeat in Pennsylvania’s 
Democratic primary in 2016, the state’s “sore loser” laws prevented him from running as 
an Independent.  Appellant sued state election officials in their official capacities, arguing 
that Pennsylvania’s sore loser and disaffiliation provisions, as well as the registration 
requirement for petition circulators, are unconstitutional.  On appeal, Appellant 
challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his claims.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. Facts 
 Appellant is a registered member of the Democratic Party who unsuccessfully ran 
for President of the United States in 2016.  After losing the Democratic Primary Election, 
Appellant submitted nomination papers to be placed on Pennsylvania’s 2016 General 
Election ballot for President as an Independent candidate.  The Commonwealth rejected 
Appellant’s nomination papers pursuant to the Pennsylvania Election Code’s “sore loser” 
provisions.  These statutes bar any unsuccessful candidate in a party’s Primary from 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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running in the General Election as an Independent in the same election year.  25 Pa. Stat. 
& Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2911(e)(5), 2911(e)(6) & 2911.1.1 
To be placed on the primary ballot of a major political party in Pennsylvania, a 
candidate must obtain 2,000 signatures from registered voters who are members of that 
party.  Id. §§ 2867 & 2872.1.  The individuals who circulate the petitions must be 
registered voters and members of the same political party as the candidate.  Id. § 
2869(a).2  In addition, § 2869(a), as written, requires that a circulator reside in the same 
                                                                
1 The Pennsylvania Election Code allows two ways for a candidate to be placed on the 
General Election Ballot: (1) as the nominee of a major political party after winning the 
party’s primary, 25 P.S. §§ 2831(a) and 2861–83; or (2) as an independent candidate or 
the designated candidate of a minor political body after obtaining the requisite signatures 
on nomination papers.  25 P.S. § 2911.  The Election Code does not permit a candidate 
both options in the same election cycle.  25 P.S. § 2911(e)(5) and (e)(6) provide in 
relevant part: 
 
There shall be appended to each nomination paper offered for filing an 
affidavit of each candidate nominated therein, stating…(5) that his name 
has not been presented as a candidate by nomination petitions for any 
public office to be voted for at the ensuing primary election, nor has he 
been nominated by any other nomination papers filed for any such office; 
(6) that in the case where he is a candidate for election at a general or 
municipal election, he was not a registered and enrolled member of a party 
thirty (30) days before the primary held prior to the general or municipal 
election in that same year. 
 
Section 2911.1, together with § 2911(e)(6) are understood as the disaffiliation 
provisions.  Section 2911.1 provides: “Any person who is a registered and enrolled 
member of a party during any period of time beginning with thirty (30) days before the 
primary and extending through the general or municipal election of that same year shall 
be ineligible to be the candidate of a political body in a general or municipal election held 
in the same year.”   
 
2 “Each [nomination petition] shall have appended thereto the affidavit of the circulator 
of each sheet, setting forth--(a) that he or she is a qualified elector duly registered and 
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political district as the office being sought.  However, in Morrill v. Weaver, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a similar residency 
requirement for minor political parties and bodies, § 2911(d), was unconstitutional.  224 
F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  After a similar action was brought challenging the 
residency requirement for circulators of nomination petitions, the Pennsylvania Secretary 
of the Commonwealth advised that it would not enforce the requirement, and the 
challenger dismissed his case.  See Notice of Dismissal, Villa v. Aichele, No. 2:13-cv-
06374 Doc. 3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2013).  The Secretary has publicly amended the 
nomination petition instructions to state explicitly that the residency requirement will not 
be enforced.  Revised Form of Nomination Petitions and Instructions, 44 Pa.B. 862 
(February 8, 2014); cf. In Re: Nomination Petitions of Brian A. Gordon, 141 A.3d 612, 
623 (Pa. Commw. 2016) (rejecting objectors’ residency-based challenges to nomination 
petitions).  
 Appellant alleges that during his 2016 campaign, registered Republican voters 
were prevented from circulating his nomination petitions under 25 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2869(a).  In addition, he avers that unregistered qualified electors were similarly 
prohibited from circulating petitions pursuant to §§ 2869(a) and 2911(d).  Id.  Appellant 
has announced his intention to run in the Democratic Presidential Primary in 2020.  He 
has also maintained that if he is unsuccessful in the Primary, he intends to run as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
enrolled as member of the designated party of the State, or of the political district, as the 
case may be . . . .”  25 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2869(a).  
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Independent candidate in the 2020 General Election.3  He intends to employ the same 
professional circulators in Pennsylvania that he used in 2016.   
 B. Procedural History  
 After Pennsylvania refused to place his name on the ballot, Appellant brought a 
civil action challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylvania Election Code’s sore loser 
and disaffiliation provisions and the provisions of the Election Code that limit who can 
circulate nomination petitions for candidates for the Democratic Primary Election.  The 
named defendants, in their official capacities, were Pedro Cortes, the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, as well as Jonathan Marks, the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Commissions, Elections, and Legislation for the Pennsylvania Department of State.  
(“Election Officials”).  Appellant sought an order of mandamus to require the Election 
Officials to place his name on the ballot as an Independent candidate for President for 
Pennsylvania’s 2016 General Election. 
 The District Court stayed the action under the Pullman abstention doctrine, R.R. 
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), to permit Pennsylvania’s state courts to 
determine whether the Election Code’s sore loser provisions apply to presidential 
candidates.  Appellant subsequently filed a mandamus action in Commonwealth Court, 
averring that his name should be placed on the ballot for the 2016 General Election 
because the sore loser provisions do not apply to presidential candidates.  However, the 
                                                                
3 In his brief, and contrary to his second amended complaint, Appellant states that since 
the 2016 General Election he has switched his registration to the Republican Party and 
plans to run in the Republican Primary Election in 2020. Regardless, Appellant 
challenges the provisions on their face and his party affiliation is immaterial to his 
claims. 
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Commonwealth Court denied Appellant’s request, holding that, as a candidate for public 
office, the sore loser provisions applied to him.  As a result, Appellant did not appear on 
the ballot for the 2016 General Election.  
 After the election, the District Court lifted the stay.  Appellant then filed an 
amended complaint averring, among other things, that he intended to run in the 
Democratic Primary in 2020, and that if he is unsuccessful in the Democratic Primary, he 
intends to run for President as an independent candidate in the 2020 General Election. 
 The District Court first addressed its own jurisdiction to hear the case, given (1) 
the mootness issues raised by a challenge to procedures which, by their nature, will only 
cause a potential injury every four years and (2) the 2016 Election had already been held.  
The Court found that the Appellant’s claims fell within the “capable of repetition yet 
evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine and were thus ripe for adjudication.  
In addition, the District Court dismissed the Election Officials’ challenge to standing, 
finding that Appellant pled sufficient facts to establish a likelihood of future harm 
necessary to establish Article III standing.4   
The Court then granted the Election Officials’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
determining that the sore loser and disaffiliation provisions were similar to state laws 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).  Next, the District 
Court held that the restrictions placed on circulators of nomination petitions were 
                                                                
4 The District Court also rejected the Election Officials’ res judicata arguments.  On 
appeal, Appellees no longer assert jurisdiction, ripeness, standing, or res judicata as 
grounds for dismissing Appellant’s claims, though, as we discuss below, we have an 
independent obligation to evaluate our own jurisdiction over the case.   
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constitutional.  The Court opined that the restrictions were justified by the associational 
rights of a political party to limit its nomination process to its own members.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the District Court distinguished Pennsylvania’s law restricting the right 
to participate in the primary process from the broader right to circulate petitions for ballot 
initiatives.  See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197 (1999) 
(striking down a Colorado statute requiring initiative-petition circulators be registered 
voters).  Lastly, the District Court rejected the Appellant’s contention that any qualified 
voter, registered or not, should be permitted to participate in the candidate selection 
process.  The Court, citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986), 
stated that Appellant’s contention “runs counter to the well-established case law giving 
political parties broad leeway in establishing their associational boundaries.”  A. 26.   
 This appeal followed.      
II. DISCUSSION 
   The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Our review of an order dismissing a complaint plenary, and we apply the same test 
as the District Court did.  Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 415 (3d Cir. 
2006).  “[I]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint 
must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all 
inferences must be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 
526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a 
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
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relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, (2007)).   
 Appellant avers that Pennsylvania’s “sore loser” provision, 25 Pa. Stat. & Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 2911(e)(5), and disaffiliation provisions, 25 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 
2911(e)(6) and 2911.1, violate the First Amendment.  Additionally, he avers that § 
2869(a)’s registration requirement5 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  These 
arguments lack merit. 
 As to the sore loser and disaffiliation provisions, the Supreme Court upheld 
similar California provisions in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).  The Court opined 
                                                                
5 Although Appellant’s complaint did not refer to § 2869(a)’s residency 
requirement, on appeal his brief refers to “state imposed restrictions requiring election 
petition circulators be residents and/or registered voters of a state,” Appellant’s Br. at 22, 
as unconstitutional.  See Appellant’s Br. at 22–24 (collecting cases).  To the extent that 
his brief can be construed to challenge § 2869(a)’s residency requirement, he lacks 
standing to do so because the Department of State has officially announced that this 
provision will not be enforced.  See Revised Form of Nomination Petitions and 
Instructions, 44 Pa. B. 862 (Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/
vol44/44-6/299.html; Petition Instructions at ¶ 3, http://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/
CandidatesCommittees/RunningforOffice/Documents/PetitionInstruction.pdf.  There is no 
suggestion that the State has deviated or intends to deviate from this policy.   
Therefore, Appellant has not averred a credible threat of administrative or criminal 
enforcement of the statute.  See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 
2342 (2014) (to establish a pre-enforcement injury, a plaintiff must allege a “credible 
threat of prosecution” under the statute); cf. 1st Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 6 F.3d 
108, 113 (3d Cir. 1993) (challenger to validity of state statute may bring suit against the 
official who is charged with the statute’s enforcement only if the official has enforced or 
threatened to enforce the statute against the plaintiff).  We will therefore uphold the 
dismissal of Appellant’s facial challenge to § 2869(a) as it pertains to the residency 
requirement, on the basis that Appellant lacks standing to challenge the provision.  See 
Williams v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 572 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We may affirm 
a judgment on any ground apparent from the record, even if the district court did not 
reach it.”).  We address his challenge to § 2869(a)’s registration requirement infra. 
 
 9 
that the sore loser provision furthered the aim of preventing “continuing intraparty 
feuds.”  Id. at 735.  Moreover, the provision “effectuate[d] this aim, the visible result 
being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the 
ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly 
qualified.”  Id.  Likewise, in considering the disaffiliation provision, the Court held that 
the provision expressed “a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the 
various routes to the ballot.”  Id. at 733.  In doing so, the Court reasoned that the 
provision “protect[ed] the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent 
candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to 
the ballot.”  Id. at 735.  Thus, “the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s 
interest in the stability of its political system.”  Id. at 736.    
 As the District Court noted, Storer differs from this case only in that California 
placed an earlier and more burdensome deadline for disaffiliation on candidates than 
Pennsylvania does.  While the Supreme Court declined to create a bright line rule for 
testing this type of provision, the District Court correctly found that “the circumstances of 
the present matter align at nearly every point with the Storer decision.”  A. 22.  The Court 
did not err in finding that Storer controlled, and thus properly dismissed Appellant’s 
constitutional challenge to §§ 2911(e)(5), 2911(e)(6), and 2911.1.6 
                                                                
6 Appellant contends that Storer was decided only with respect to candidates for 
Congress and is thus distinguishable because he was running for President.  He bases his 
assertion on two cases: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).  However, as the District Court aptly 
explained, these cases do not establish that presidential elections are special for purposes 
of evaluating the sore loser and disaffiliation provisions. 
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Appellant also argues that § 2869(a)’s registration requirement is unconstitutional.  
Section 2869(a) requires that electors be duly registered and enrolled as members of the 
same political party that is holding the primary.  Appellant avers that this requirement 
violates the free speech rights of unregistered but qualified electors who want to circulate 
nominating petitions, as well as registered electors of a different party from the one 
identified on the petition.  His arguments are unavailing. 
“The First Amendment protects ‘the freedom to join together in furtherance of 
common political beliefs.’”  Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000) 
(quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-15 (1986)).  This 
“necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the 
association, and to limit the association to those people only.”  Id. (quoting Democratic 
Party of U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).  Moreover, “[i]n no 
area is the political association’s right to exclude more important than in the process of 
selecting its nominee.”  Id. at 575.  Accordingly, “the associational ‘interest’ in selecting 
the candidate of a group to which one does not belong . . . falls far short of a 
constitutional right, if indeed it can even be characterized as an interest.”  Id. at 575 n. 5.   
While we have not spoken directly on the issue of registration requirements for 
petition circulators, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had occasion to do so in 
Maslow v. Board of Elections in the City of New York, 658 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2011).  
There, the Court rejected a challenge to a nearly identical New York election law.  Citing 
Jones, the Court emphasized the importance of a political party being able to exclude in 
the nominee selection process.  Id. at 296.  In addition, the Court opined that “Plaintiffs 
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are only restrained from engaging in speech that is inseparably bound up with the . . . 
plaintiffs’ association with a political party to which they do not belong.  As plaintiffs 
have no right to this association, they have no right to engage in any speech collateral to 
it.”  Id. at 298.  Moreover, the Court concluded that “the State has a legitimate interest in 
protecting its political parties from party raiding.”  Id.  The Second Circuit’s reasoning is 
persuasive and applicable to the provision before us.  The District Court was correct to 
dismiss Appellant’s challenge to the registration requirement.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment and order.  
